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Abstract Every time drivers take to the road, and with each mile that they drive, ex-
poses themselves and others to the risk of an accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly
linked to mileage, however, and have lump-sum characteristics largely. The result is too much
driving, and too many accidents. In this paper, we introduce some useful theoretical results
for Pay-As-You-Drive in Automobile insurances. We consider a counting process and also
find the distribution of discounted collective risk model when the counting process is non-
homogeneous Poisson.
Keywords Cox Process, Martingales, Aggregate Risk Models, PAYD, Actuarial Math-
ematics.
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1 Introduction
In most developed countries, automobile insurance represents a considerable share of the
yearly non-life premium collection. Because the majority of the incurred losses are usually
very high. Therefore using this Insurance for car owners in some countries (such as Iran) is in
force. Also, many attempts have been made in the actuarial literature to find a good model for
calculating the premiums; for a review of the existing literature, we refer the interested readers,
e.g., to Lemaire (1985), Lemaire (1995), or Frangos and Vrontos (2001).
In a general case there are two different approaches:
• Premium will be fixed for all of policyholders,
• Premium will be different for all of policyholders.
The first approach is unfair because, in this way, a policyholder who had an accident
with a small size of loss (or did not have an accident) is being unfairly disadvantaged to a
policyholder who had an accident with a big size of the loss. The second method is the right
way and is the base of Bonus Malus Systems (BMS). BMS penalizes insurers responsible
for one or more accidents by premium surcharges (or maluses), and rewarding claim-free
policyholders by awarding them discounts (or bonuses). This is a very efficient way of
classifying policyholders into cells according to their risk (see Denuit and Dhaene, 2001). A
BMS calculates the premium applicable as a base premium, adjusted by a quantity (the bonus
or malus) which depends on previous claims experience (see Taylor, 1997). There are three
systems for adjusting the premiums:
• BMS based on the frequency component,
• BMS based on the frequency and severity component,
• BMS based on the frequency component, severity component and individual character-
istics (such as sex, age, type of car, location and ...).
It is obvious that the third system is a generalization of two other systems (seeFrangos and Vrontos,
2001). Moreover, Mahmoudvand and Hassani (2009) have introduced a new generalization of
BMS that covers all three types of BMS that mentioned above.
Recently, some researchers believe that the current lump-sum pricing of auto insurance is
inefficient and inequitable (see Bordoff and Noel, 2008). Even according to the optimal BMS,
drivers who are similar in claims and individual characteristics pay nearly the same premiums
if they drive five thousand or fifty thousand miles a year. Considerable research indicates that
annual crash rates and claim costs tend to increase with annual vehicle mileage (see Litman,
2009). This pricing system is inequitable because low-mileage drivers subsidize insurance
costs for high-mileage drivers, and low-income people drive fewer miles on average.
A better approach is simple and obvious: pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) auto insurance. With
PAYD, insurance premiums would be priced per mile driven. All other risk factors will still
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be taken into account so that a high-risk driver would pay a higher per-mile premium than a
low-risk driver. With insurance costs that vary with miles driven, people would be able to
save money by reducing their driving, and this incentive would lead to fewer driving-related
harms. PAYDwould also be more equitable because it would eliminate the cross-subsidization
of insurance costs from low-mileage to high-mileage drivers.
Parry (2005) shows that PAYD is slightly more efficient than a simple tax on vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) for a given fuel reduction and even performs reasonably well relative to a fully
optimized VMT tax. Although PAYD insurance has long been advocated by transportation
planners, little attention has been given to the precise design of a distance-based pricing system.
Remain of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present the discounted collective risk
models and some useful Theorems on it. In Section 3, we enter the mileage to the discounted
collective risk model to consider PAYD. Finally, some conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 Discounted Collective Risk Models
Although the collective risk model seems to have many advantages, one of its drawbacks is
that it overlooks the arrival time of claims and the effect of the interest rate. In property liability
insurance contracts, there is always a time lag between the premium payment and claims arrival
time. During this time lags, the insurer earns investment income on the unexpanded component
of the premium, which is not involved in the collective risk model. So the insured is eligible
to have some of this investment profit during the policy coverage period.
Definition 1 A discounted collective risk model (DCRM) in a specific period of time (0; t],
represents the total loss, Zt , as the sum of a random number claims, N(t), of individual
present value payment amounts
(
X1, X2, ..., XN(t)
)
respect to arrival times
(
W1,W2, ...,WN(t)
)
and constant force of interest δ as follows:
Zt =
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi e
−δWi (1)
Where:
• Individual claims Xi are independent and identically distributed,
• N(t) and Xi are independent, and
• Zt = 0 when N(t) = 0.
The DCRM defined as above has several interesting and useful properties. At first, it
incorporates investment income into the pricing model. Moreover, it provides a better model
for property and liability insurance in which the interval between premium payments and claim
payments is a significant factor. Therefore, insurers can present long term insurance products
in the property and liability insurance market. One important quantity is the expected value
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of Zt , which can be interpreted as the net premium amount needed to cover insurance liability
on its becoming due without paying any expenses or contingent charges. We calculate this
expect value in an important special case of DCRMwhere N(t) has non-homogeneous Poisson
distribution.
Using themartingale approach,many interesting results can be obtained; refer toGerber and Shiu
(1997) for a thorough discussion. In the following theorem, we use a similar technique to find
the moment generating a function of Zt .
Theorem 1 Let MZt (u) denote the moment generating function (m.g.f) of Zt defined by relation
12 and let N(t) ∼ Possion(λ(t)), then
MZt (u) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
λ(s)
(
1 − MX
(
u e−δs
))}
, (2)
where MX(.) is m.g.f of X .
Proof. Consider process {Mt}t>0 =
{
euZt
g(t,u)
}
t>0
where g(t, u) is a function to be determined
later and satisfies in the initial condition g(0, u) = 1. We first seek a value of g(t, u) such that
{Mt}t>0 is a martingale. To do this, we note that based on the properties of martingale, Mt
must satisfy in the following relation (for all h > 0):
E
[
Mt+h
Mt
|Mt = mt
]
= 1.
In this case, we have:
E
[
e
u
∑N(t+h)
i=N(t)+1
Xie
−δWi
]
=
g(t + h, u)
g(t, u)
Now by the rule of Iterated expectation, it can be shown that
E
[
E
[
e
u
∑N(t+h)
i=N(t)+1
Xie
−δWi
|N(t + h) − N(t) = k
] ]
=
∑∞
k=0 E
[
e
u
∑N(t+h)
i=N(t)+1
Xie
−δWi
|N(t + h) − N(t) = k
]
Pr [N(t + h) − N(t) = k]
=
g(t+h,u)
g(t,u)
(3)
Based on the properties of the Poisson process we can rewrite 2 as follows,
∑∞
k=0 E
[
e
u
∑N(t+h)
i=N(t)+1
Xie
−δWi
|N(t + h) − N(t) = k
]
Pr [N(t + h) − N(t) = k]
= (1 − λ(t)h) + E
[
euXN(t+h)e
−δ(t+h)
|N(t + h) − N(t) = k
]
λ(t)h + o(h)
= (1 − λ(t)h) + MX
(
ue−δ(t+h)
)
λ(t)h + o(h) =
g(t+h,u)
g(t,u)
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Where o(h) is a generic function that goes to zero faster than h when h goes to zero. By a few
simplifications we have:
− λ(t)
(
1 − MX
(
ue−δ(t+h)
))
+
o(h)
h
=
g(t + h, u) − g(t, u)
h.g(t, u)
(4)
Taking limits as h → 0 in the above relation, we have:
d
dt
lng(t, u) =
(
1 − MX
(
ue−δt
))
(5)
Now it is sufficient to show that MZt = g(t, u) = g(t, u). It follows from the initial condition
g(0, u) = 1 that M0 = 1. Moreover based on the properties of martingale, we have E(Mt) =
E(M0) = 1, which completes the proof.
Corollary 1 Suppose in the DCRM(1), N(t) ∼ Poisson(λt), then
E [Zt] =
µ1λ
δ
(
1 − e−δt
)
, (6)
where µ1 = E(X).
Corollary 2 Process {At}t>0 =
{
Zt −
µ1λ
δ
(
1 − e−δt
)}
t>0
is a martingale.
Let us now consider the discrepancy between the obtained premiums based on the collective
risk model, and by the DCRM equation (6). Recall that if St shows the collective risk model,
then St =
∑
i = 1N(t)Xi In fact St is a special case of relation (6) when the δ → 0. It is easy
to see that,
lim
δ→0
E [Zt] = E [St] .
Another special case is when t → ∞. In this case:
lim
t→∞
E [Zt] = lim
t→∞
µ1λ
δ
(
1 − e−δt
)
, (7)
which can be interpreted as a single net premium for a perpetuity that continuously pays
µ1λ.
Moreover, note that if δ → ∞, then E[Zt] → 0, and when t → 0, then E[Zt] → 0, which
are reasonable results.
Corollary 3 Consider the DCRM described in 12, if N(t) ∼ Poisson(λt), then
Var [Zt] =
µ2λ
2δ
(
1 − e−2δt
)
(8)
where µ2 = E
(
X2
)
.
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Corollary 4 The process {Bt}t>0 =
{(
Zt −
µ1λ
δ
(
1 − e−δt
) )2
−
µ2λ
2δ
(
1 − e−2δt
)}
t>0
is a mar-
tingale.
Example 1 In the discounted collective risk, let claim sizes are exponentially distributed with
mean then the m.g.f is given by:
MZt (u) = E
[
euZt
]
=
(
1 − βue−δt
1 − βu
) λ
δ
. (9)
It follows from this example that:
lim
δ→0
MZt (u) = exp
(
λtuβ
1 − uβ
)
(10)
Moreover by limiting when t tend to in
nity we have:
lim
δ→0
MZt (u) = (1 − uβ)
− λ
δ (11)
which are coincide to the results that Gerber (1979) has obtained.
3 Modeling PAYD by means of DCRM
In PAYD Insurance, we have lots of information with the help of the GPS system, and our
goal is to set a premium based on the distance that a person travels during a year. By presenting
this new product, insurers are facing a new source of risk, which is a random premium. We
do not have an exact amount of kilometers that the driver will drive. Let d(t) is mileage to
time t. We would like to define a DCRM that consider d(t). To do this, there is two different
approaches to consider d(t) in the models.
Thefirst approach is using double subordinatedmodel defined bySato(1999); Shirvani et al.
(2019). Subordination is an often used stochastic process in modeling asset prices. Appli-
cations of subordination model and Lévy processes arise in science and engineering, e.g.,
quantum mechanics, insurance, economics, finance, biomathematics, etc.1 Shirvani et al.
(2019) introduced the theory of multiple subordinated model to modeling the tail behavior of
stock market returns.2
To apply the double subordinator models for modeling the the DCRM, Let Xi and d(t) =
U(t), be Lévy subordinators.3 Then, the double subordinator V(t) = Xi (U(t)) represent the
1See Michna (2010), Sims et al. (2012),Lefévre and Picard (2013), Morales (2007), Levajković et al. (2016),
Shirvani and Volchenkov (2019), and Shirvani et al. (2019).
2See also Shirvani et al. (2019).
3A Lévy subordinator is a Lévy process with an increasing sample path (see Sato, 1999).
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individual claims when the subordinator d(t) = U(t) is the miles mileage to time t. Therefore,
the DCRM model is
Zt =
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi (U(t)) e
−δWi . (12)
However, this model for DRCM is a new method, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The second approach for modeling d(t) is to use the Double Stochastic Poisson Process
(DSPP). Since the goal of this paper is using DSPP processes, let us give a brief definition
of DSPP. We notice that many alternative definitions of a DSPP can be given (see Grandell,
1976; Bremaud, 1981).
Definition 2 A DSPP {N(t) : t > t0} with intensity stochastic process {λ (t, d(t)) : t > t0} is
defined as a conditioned Poisson process which intensity is the process {λ (t, d(t))) : t > t0}
given the information process {d(t) : t > t0} .
The DSPP, or Cox process, provides flexibility by letting the intensity not only depend
on time but also by allowing it to be a stochastic process. Therefore, the doubly stochastic
Poisson process can be viewed as a two-step randomization procedure. An intensity process
{λ (t, d(t)) : t > t0} is used to generate another process {N(t) : t > t0} by acting as its intensity.
If {λ (t, d(t)) : t > t0} is deterministic, then {N(t) : t > t0} is a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process. If {λ (t, d(t)) : t > t0} = λ for some positive random variable λ, then {N(t) : t > t0}
is a mixed Poisson process.
Theorem 2 Let MZt (u) denote the m.g.f of Zt defined by relation (12) and let N(t) is a DSPP
with intensity process (λ(t, d(t))), then
MZt (u) = E
[
exp
{
−
∫ t
0
λ (s, d(s))
(
1 − Mx
(
ue−δs
))
dt
}]
(13)
where MX(.) is m.g.f of X .
Proof. Conditioning on (λ(t, d(t))) and using Theorem (1) results can be obtained.
Corollary 5 Under conditions of the Theorem (2) we have
E [Zt] = µ1E
[∫ t
0
λ (s, d(s)) e−δsds
]
. (14)
4 Conclusion
With PAYD, insurance premiums would be priced per mile driven. All other risk factors
will still be taken into account so that a high-risk driver would pay a higher per-mile premium
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than a low-risk driver. With insurance costs that vary with miles driven, people would be able
to save money by reducing their driving, and this incentive would lead to fewer driving-related
harms. PAYDwould also be more equitable because it would eliminate the cross-subsidization
of insurance costs from low-mileage to high-mileage drivers.
As we said, the DSPP provides flexibility by letting the intensity not only depend on time
but also by allowing it to be a stochastic process. Therefore, the doubly stochastic Poisson
process can be viewed as a two-step randomization procedure. We show that it is possible to
model PAYD by using DSPP.
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